"0-days That Weren't (Quick or Accurate, Take Your Pick)"

As timescales compress in computer security, research organizations feel increasing pressure to be first to report on a threat. It’s hard to perform lengthy fact checking in hours time. In the last couple of months we heard about two different 0-day attacks from two different major security vendors, neither of which were 0-day attacks. This week analysis was posted on a “new” anti-virtual-keyboard technique used by a password stealing trojan; only problem is that technique is at least 3 years old. And this week an IE 7 0-day vulnerability turned out to be more than 5 months old.

Of course the irony is that other researchers have to chase the claims, which reduces the amount of time available for fact checking prior to release for the issues they’re trying to report on; so it’s a vicious cycle. Additionally, people who report on such issues are often excited and anxious to spread the news, not to mention the competitive aspect of all of this.

Generally speaking, the largest organizations tend to lean towards lengthy validation cycles, taking a long time to react, while smaller shops may only do a quick check to validate their claims.

Personally I think either extreme is not good and a balance needs to be found. Part of that balance should include going with what you know at the time, allowing for terms like ‘under investigation’ or ‘believed to be’, while reserving absolute statements until after due diligence has been given.

Maybe that’s just me?