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	<title>Comments on: Code Cleanup Gone Wrong</title>
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	<link>http://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/code-cleanup-gone-wrong</link>
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		<title>By: Craig Hughes</title>
		<link>http://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/code-cleanup-gone-wrong/comment-page-1#comment-17038</link>
		<dc:creator>Craig Hughes</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 16 May 2008 16:33:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.labs.com/research/blog/?p=652#comment-17038</guid>
		<description>This problem is of course not limited to debian servers, since any SSH server which has a compromised key (possibly generated elsewhere) in a user&#039;s authorized_keys file will be vulnerable.  All SSH server operators should scan their systems&#039; users immediately for vulnerable keys.  I have used the pre-generated vulnerable key lists to run some attempted auths automatedly (and somewhat naÃ¯vely) against my own machine, and can run about 50 keys per second with a simple one-line perl script (using ssh-agent to try 7 keys per connection attempt).  The openssh daemon only logs the connection attempts, but *not* the failures when you pass a non-valid key.  50 keys/second means the entire 32k RSA-2048 keyspace can be attempted in about 10 minutes against a single server.  This could trivially be parallelized in a botnet.  If I were to pick a username to try all the keys against, I&#039;d probably suggest something like &quot;root&quot;.

How long before we start seeing tens of thousands of compromised unix systems out there being added to the botnets?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This problem is of course not limited to debian servers, since any SSH server which has a compromised key (possibly generated elsewhere) in a user&#8217;s authorized_keys file will be vulnerable.  All SSH server operators should scan their systems&#8217; users immediately for vulnerable keys.  I have used the pre-generated vulnerable key lists to run some attempted auths automatedly (and somewhat naÃ¯vely) against my own machine, and can run about 50 keys per second with a simple one-line perl script (using ssh-agent to try 7 keys per connection attempt).  The openssh daemon only logs the connection attempts, but *not* the failures when you pass a non-valid key.  50 keys/second means the entire 32k RSA-2048 keyspace can be attempted in about 10 minutes against a single server.  This could trivially be parallelized in a botnet.  If I were to pick a username to try all the keys against, I&#8217;d probably suggest something like &#8220;root&#8221;.</p>
<p>How long before we start seeing tens of thousands of compromised unix systems out there being added to the botnets?</p>
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