Chris Barton
Having been with "big red" since the Dr Solomons acquisition Chris has seen many come and go but is never content to be ...
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Google’s code-hosting project is the latest free service to be abused by web spammers. We’ve seen one or two previously, but over the holidays the situation appears to have got much worse. They are creating lots of new projects with the following type of website on:
Clicking the image will take you to today’s fake codec download site. Repeated clicks will take you to an adult site [both NSFW, you have been warned!].
The difference between this and the MSN Spaces abuse that is now about a year old is that Google appears to automatically index code projects, so any Google-Jedi can generate a good list (Google Search–again, don’t click the links) to start with.
Or the fact that the image is linked from http://bestsextube dot net/video.gif all the time might also be useful to know.
The icing on the cake, though, is the link to somewhere/in.cgi … I’ll come back to this later.
The porntube site is also host to a number of other related sites such as fake anti-anything software:
The codec download site, which is in Latvia, also hosts a number of related sites:
The Google Code project owner has a few other projects of a similar nature, too.
A year ago I blogged about MSN Spaces beta with a very similar issue… I even spoke to some very nice folks there about it, and a year later it’s still being abused by spammers [ spamhaus award. ] I trust Google would like to appear less evil and will take more decisive action. I’d suggest mashing code and safe browsing together, but it appears not to find anything wrong with the clickable links, though it did catch on after some redirection took place.
…perhaps I should start consulting on this sort of thing
Anybody suffering deja-vous? “/in.cgi should ring an alarm bell or two. If not, check out my colleague Micha’s blog on traffic management. He explains what happens to those clicks! This is campaign “6.”
Happy new year to all!
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Tags: google, google code, in.cgi, msn spaces, traffic manager
Do a search for Hunt’s Point within Google video,
and then click on the hit entitled,
Hunts Point Pimps And Hookers @ kooldvd.com
page redirects, foisting fake Flash installer upon.
Reverse traces to Latvia.IP Address: 94.247.2.34
Location: RIGA (56.944N, 24.117E)
Network: 94-RIPE
domain: zlkon.lv
admin-c: 86617-LUMII
tech-c: 86617-LUMII
nserver: ns1.zlkon.lv
nserver: ns2.zlkon.lv
changed: dns-reg
nic
lv 20081121
source: LUMII
person:
address: none
phone: +371 26330593
e-mail: arkadzi
daniyelian
zlkon
lv
nic-hdl: 86617-LUMII
source: LUMII
File Info Description
Report Generated 25.1.2009 at 0.32.30 (GMT 1)
Time for scan: 31 seconds
Filename: FlashPlayer.v3.181.exe
File size: 110 KB
MD5 Hash: D3EE381464C72DA4671C1B8F15A8281B
SHA1 Hash: B48EA7824B3DFC130FBF200BE7AB5D1D7ED96484
CRC32: 3376619150
Application Type: Executable (EXE) 32bit
Packer detected: Nullsoft PiMP Stub [Nullsoft PiMP SFX] *
Self-Extract Archive: Nothing found
Binder Detector: Nothing found
ASCII Strings: View
Detection Rate: 3 on 24 (12,5 %)
Antivirus Sig Version Result
a-squared 25/01/2009 Nothing found!
Avira AntiVir 7.1.1.173 Nothing found!
Avast 090124-0 NSIS:Fasec [Trj]
AVG 270.10.7/1893 Nothing found!
BitDefender 25/01/2009 Nothing found!
ClamAV 25/01/2009 Nothing found!
Comodo 944 Nothing found!
Dr.Web 25/01/2009 Nothing found!
Ewido 25/01/2009 Nothing found!
F-PROT 6 20090124 Nothing found!
G DATA 19.2579 Packed.Win32.Tdss.a A
IkarusT3 24/01/2009 Nothing found!
Kaspersky 25/01/2009 Packed.Win32.Tdss.a
McAfee 17/01/2009 Nothing found!
MHR (Malware Hash Registry) 25/01/2009 Nothing found!
NOD32 v3 3796 Nothing found!
Norman 2009/01/23 Nothing found!
Panda 21/01/2009 Nothing found!
QuickHeal 24 January, 2009 Nothing found!
Solo Antivirus 25/01/2009 Nothing found!
Sophos 25/01/2009 Nothing found!
TrendMicro 791(579100) Nothing found!
VBA32 25/01/2009 Nothing found!
VirusBuster 10.100.37 Nothing found!
Trojan.DNSChanger.Gen is a generic class of trojans that reconfigure DNS
(Domain Name Server) settings on compromised machines in order to ensure
that all network requests from those PCs are directed to servers and
networks controlled by malicious parties, who can then inject malicious
content into otherwise legitimate web pages or even redirect requests for
standard web sites to bogus, malicious web sites.
[...] McAfee Avert Labså®‰å…¨ç ”ç©¶ä¸»ä»»Dave Marcus指出,Google Code是為程å¼è¨è¨ˆå¸«ä»£ç®¡é–‹ç™¼è¨ˆç•«å’Œç¨‹å¼ç¢¼çš„ç¶²ç«™ã€‚é™¤äº†åˆæ³•的程å¼ä¹‹å¤–,還有引導使用者下載éºç¼ºç·¨ç¢¼çš„å‡å½±éŸ³é€£çµã€‚但這些程å¼ç¢¼ç«Ÿæ˜¯å·å–密碼和金èžå€‹è³‡çš„æœ¨é¦¬è»Ÿé«”。 [...]
Thanks for the infor but can u tell me if the antivirus softwares can block such web sites
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